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Using an inventory of local and/or non-statutory transfers  in thirteen French towns and 
cities including Paris, Lyon and Marseille, we measure the gains from returning to work for 
recipients of means-tested benefits (RMI and API) by type of household.  
The reforms of national and statutory benefits carried out during the 2000s, especially those 
affecting the employment tax credit (PPE), failed to ensure that the recipients of means-
tested benefits always stood to gain from returning to work. In most localities and for most 
types of household, taking a part-time job on the minimum wage represents a loss of income 
compared to staying on welfare, and full-time work does not always present any advantage. 
The effects of the reforms were offset by the effects of other measures such as the widespread 
provision  of  travel  assistance  by  regional  councils,  the  development  of  social  tariffs  for 
telephone and electricity, or exemption from paying the television licence fee. 
We then simulate the effects of introducing the RSA in place of the RMI. We take into account 
the way that local and/or non-statutory transfers (“droits connexes”) are modified by the 
increases in national transfers. We observe that the RSA does indeed eliminate those areas 
where returning to work is unprofitable, for almost all localities and types of household. 
Lastly, we show that the marginal tax rate of 38 % chosen by the government in its bill is 
very close to the upper limit compatible with a back-to-work incentive. 
Key words: RMI, API, unemployment, means-tested benefits, back-to-work incentives. 
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Introduction 
Twenty  years after the creation of the “Revenu Minimum d’Insertion” (RMI –  minimum 
integration  income),  the  French  system  of  means-tested  benefits  underwent  a  profound 
transformation in 2009 with the introduction of the “Revenu de Solidarité Active” (RSA – 
earned income supplement). The RSA replaced both the RMI and the “Allocation Parent 
Isolé” (API – single parent allowance). Its objective is to ensure that “returning to work is 
always more profitable than staying on welfare, and that work should give everyone the 
guarantee of escaping and being protected from poverty”
1.  
This change followed a long series of reforms, each intended to avoid the phenomenon where 
returning to work pays less than staying on welfare. Were these measures ineffective from 
that point of view? Is the RSA more efficient? 
These are difficult questions to answer, because the French measures of income support are 
so complex. To start with, we must distinguish between two types of welfare benefits. There 
is a national, statutory platform of primary welfare, consisting of means-tested benefits such 
as the RMI, the API or the RSA, family allowances such as the childcare allowance or the 
back-to-school allowance, housing benefits, etc. Then there is a huge range of secondary 
benefits that are known as “droits connexes”, local and/or non-statutory transfers. Some of 
these are statutory: the Christmas bonus, television licence fee exemptions, “social tariffs” 
for  telephone  and  electricity,  the  CMU  (universal  healthcare  cover)  and  complementary 
CMU  (covering  100%  of  costs).  Other  welfare  benefits  are  non-statutory:  the  Conseils 
Généraux (French “county councils”) are responsible for social welfare at the level of each 
department  and  give  a  variety  of  benefits  to  poor  households,  such  as  housing  support, 
mobility or holiday allowances; each local family allowance fund has a degree of autonomy 
in  the  distribution  of  benefits  to  its  recipients;  social  welfare/community  centres  provide 
school  meal allowances, leisure centres and holiday camps;  municipalities apply reduced 
fares  for  sports  facilities  and  cultural  attractions  (museums,  exhibitions,  etc.);  lastly,  the 
regions,  in  charge  of transport,  have  developed  travel  benefits  where  they  meet  costs  of 
travelling by public transport. 
Individually, these secondary benefits are of relatively low value, but together they constitute 
an essential additional resource for poor households. According to our study on this subject, 
published  in  2002,  these  benefits  account  for  about  20 %  of  the  total  resources  of  poor 
inactive households (Anne and L’Horty, 2002). So we cannot afford to ignore them, if our 
aim is to evaluate the gains from returning to work for poor households. The problem is that 
each of these benefits has its own particular scale, varying from one institution to another and 
so from one locality to another, and there is no exhaustive record of these local scales. That 
explains why these transfers are not taken into account in works on social transfers, and more 
especially in the simulations carried out by the economic administration for the purpose of 
informing public policy.  
The aim of the present study is to propose a measurement of the gains from returning to work 
and the  effects of reforms of the  means-tested benefits that takes into account all social 
transfers, including local and/or non-statutory benefits. For this purpose, we use a method of 
typical cases and an inventory of all the local and/or non-statutory benefits offered in thirteen 
French towns and cities, including Paris, Lyon and Marseille. The data were collected in late 
2006  and  early  2007.  They  enable  us  to  measure  the  gains  from  returning  to  work  for 
                                              
1  Extract  from  the  “letter  of  mission”  from  the  President  of  the  Republic  and  the  Prime  Minister  to  the  High 
Commissioner for Active Solidarity against Poverty, Martin Hirsch. 3 
recipients of means-tested benefits (RMI and API) according to the type of household (using 
seven different types of household).  
The first section gives an overview of the studies and reforms carried out in France over the 
last  ten  years,  from  the  first  reports  on  means-tested  benefits  to  the  Earned  Income 
Supplement bill. The second section presents our methodology and the hypotheses adopted to 
construct  the  data.  Section  three  describes  the  results  of  the  descriptive  data  processing, 
thereby providing an account of the gains from returning to work before the introduction of 
the RSA. Section four presents the results of our simulations of the RSA and its effects on the 
income of recipients of means-tested benefits when they go back to work.  
1. A DECADE OF REFORMS: FROM THE ACR TO THE RSA 
Enacted by the law of December 1
st 2008, the Earned Income Supplement (RSA) came into 
force in 2009, replacing both the Minimum Integration Income (RMI) and the Single Parent 
Allowance (API). When it was introduced in 1988, the RMI had itself represented a major 
reform  of  the  French  welfare  system,  instituting  a  basic  form  of  means-tested  universal 
allowance  for  anyone  aged  over  25  and  for  younger  adults  with  children.  The  API  was 
reserved for single parents with children under three years old. The RSA is a new welfare 
benefit based on a specific scale so that a rise in income from working is not cancelled out by 
a fall in income from transfers. The aim is to guarantee that returning to work systematically 
increases the income of poor households. This objective had not been achieved with the RMI, 
which was a differential allowance combined with a temporary incentive mechanism (a more 
formal comparison of the two measures is presented in Appendix 1). 
Although innovative in its scale and method of implementation, the RSA is the latest in a 
long series of reforms of social transfers for low income groups, all aiming to increase the 
incentives for returning to work, whose origins can be traced back to the late 1990s. Since the 
“law against exclusion” of 1998, which extended the incentive mechanism of the RMI
2, there 
have been a large number of reforms of the instruments of redistribution with a view to 
improving the gains from returning to work for the beneficiaries of means-tested benefits. 
These include the reform of the taxe d’habitation (local council tax) in 2000, the reform of 
housing benefits in 2001, the introduction of a working tax credit (PPE
3) the same year and 
its extensions every year since, the tightening of unemployment benefits after 2003, strong hikes 
in the SMIC (national minimum wage) in 2003 and 2005, or the “back-to-work bonus” of 1000 
euros introduced in 2005 and extended in 2006. All these institutional changes, adopted by 
successive governments of left and right, are practical expressions of the political desire to 
“make work pay”, so that returning to work really does represent a gain for recipients of 
means-tested benefits. 
Preceding this succession of reforms leading up to the RSA, numerous studies over at least 
ten years had confirmed the observation that the monetary gains from returning to work for 
those  on  means-tested  benefits  were  simply  insufficient.  The  first  studies  were  based  on 
typical cases and micro-simulations of national and statutory transfers (Padieu, 1997; Cserc, 
                                              
2 If they returned to work, recipients continued to receive their RMI allowance during three months. For the next nine 
months they received 50% of it. 
3 The PPE (prime pour l’emploi) is a tax credit given to low-income working households but not to households which 
have no earned income. If there is no tax due, the PPE takes the form of a negative tax. 4 
1997; Eyssartier and Paillaud, 1998; Bourguignon and Bureau, 1999). A second wave of 
studies set out to identify and describe the beneficiaries affected by this lack of monetary 
gain  (Laroque  and  Salanié,  1999;  Gurgand  and  Margolis,  2001;  Legendre,  Lorgnet  and 
Thibault, 2002). These works indicated that several hundred thousand people were concerned 
by this situation on the French labour market. A third type of study widened the field of 
observation to include local and/or non-statutory transfers, concluding that previous studies, 
which had not taken these elements into consideration, were underestimates (Anne and L’Horty, 
2002). In terms of the fight against poverty, it is important to consider income as a whole, taking 
into account not only state benefits, but also those paid out by departments, communes, family 
allowance funds, even charities.  
These studies, essentially produced by economists, were widely taken up in official reports 
and translated into more political proposals. In 1999, in one of the last memos of the Saint-
Simon foundation, Roger Godino suggested the idea of a compensatory income allowance, a 
proposal  that  was  taken  up,  costed  and  subjected  to  a  complex  institutional  process  that 
eventually resulted in the PPE of 2001. To begin with, this working tax credit was of low 
value and focused on the full-time minimum wage. Poorly targeted, it was reformed every 
twelve  months,  to  increase  its  value  and  shift  its  focus  onto  part-time  work,  where  the 
problems of insufficient gains from returning to work are the most serious. The debate was 
revived  by  the  2004  CERC  report  on  child  poverty,  which  highlighted  the  scale  of  the 
problem, backed up by concrete figures. In response, the Minister of Solidarity, Health and 
Families,  Philippe  Douste-Blazy,  set  up  the  commission  on  Families,  Vulnerability  and 
Poverty within the Ministry of Social Affairs, chaired by Martin Hirsch. To reduce poverty in 
France, this commission proposed a “new social equation” that foreshadowed the RSA. The 
Hirsch commission report stressed the importance of local and non-statutary transfers. The 
parliamentary reports of Valérie Létard (2005) and Laurent Wauquiez (2005) confirmed the 
legitimacy of this proposal, again stressing the problems caused by local and non-statutary 
benefits from the perspective of the insufficiency of gains from returning to work.  
In this context of intense parliamentary and legislative activity and given the quantity and 
quality of the studies conducted on these issues, we believe that two important questions 
must be addressed. Firstly, have the reforms of the last ten years succeeded in eliminating or 
at least limiting the range of wages for which gains from returning to work are insufficient 
for  those  on  means-tested  benefits?  If  this  proved  to  be  the  case,  it  would  be  hard  to 
understand the reason for a new, wide-reaching reform like the RSA. Whence the second 
question: what contribution does the RSA actually make?  
These two questions can only be satisfactorily answered if we consider the architecture of 
social transfers in its entirety. It is not acceptable to limit the observation solely to national 
and statutory transfers. We must take into consideration all the sources of income of poor 
households,  including  local  benefits  and  non-statutory  transfers.  According  to  our  study 
published in 2002, these transfers represent on average about 15 to 20 % of the resources of a 
household with no earned income, a proportion that cannot be neglected.  
2. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
We use the micro-simulation model EQUINOXE, developed for our first study of local and/or 
non-statutary transfers which covered all the resources and benefits received by households 
in 2001 according to different types of household in ten French communes of varying sizes, 5 
located in different departments: Paris (19
th and 20
th arrondissements), Lyon (69), Marseille 




EQUINOXE is an integrated quantitative evaluator of local and/or non-statutary transfers. It is a system of 
observation of benefits to low-income households and simulation of the reforms of social transfers. It is the 
only tool of evaluation and calculation available in France that incorporates the local dimension of social 
transfers by taking into account the benefits given by communes, departments, family allowance funds and 
local charities. For a sample of thirteen towns and cities including Paris, Lyon and Marseille, EQUINOXE 
calculates the amount of social benefits according to the household’s resources. The viewpoint adopted is that 
of the household receiving benefits. The simulator incorporates all the national and/or statutory benefits and 
all the local and/or non-statutory ones, for all benefits that are monetary (or can be attributed a monetary 
value) and calculated on the basis of a scale. The first version of the model was presented in the study by 
Anne and L’Horty [2002]. The present study uses a second version of the model on data collected in late 2006 
and early 2007 and on a new set of localities.  
In each locality and for each type of household, EQUINOXE calculates the total benefits received by income, 
taking into account the conditions governing the accumulation of different entitlements. It reconstructs the 
total benefits, net incomes and marginal tax rates by income, by category of benefits, by type of household 
and by locality. It also evaluates the number of hours that must be worked per week on the minimum wage to 
earn at least as much as the household would receive by not working (what we call the “reservation working 
time”). The calculations are performed for households receiving the RMI, the AI or the ASS. In simulation 
mode, EQUINOXE MODIFIES the local and/or non-statutary transfers in line with the reforms of national and 
statutory benefits, whether or not they are parametric. From the moment that the level of national benefits is 
included in the calculation basis of a local benefit (which EQUINOXE verifies), this tool allows to evaluate the 
effect on incomes of a reform of social transfers, taking into account the interdependencies between the 
different benefits. 
 6 
The geographical field of the present study is different. It is based on an inventory of welfare 
benefits carried out in late 2006 for the ONPES, the national observatory of poverty and 
social exclusion (Baillon J.-N., Bellaredj F., Douard O., Mazalto M., 2006), which studies the 
local  welfare  benefits  in  ten  medium-sized  French  towns  (between  50,000  and 
100,000 inhabitants) in five different departments: Bouches-du-Rhône (Arles and Martigues), 
Hérault  (Béziers  and  Sète),  Nord  (Tourcoing  and  Villeneuve  d’Ascq),  Seine-Saint-Denis 
(Drancy  and  Montreuil),  Val-de-Marne  (Fontenay-sous-Bois  and  Ivry-sur-Seine).  We  have 
incorporated all the scales collected by the ONPES study into our simulator. We have added the 
missing  scales  (national  non-statutary  transfers,  municipal  aids  for  sports  and  cultural 
activities, specific price scales for meals, regional travel benefits) and we have widened the 
geographical field by collecting and including the scales for the three biggest cities in France 
(Paris, Lyon and Marseille). These scales were collected in late 2006 but we have taken into 
account certain changes that occurred in 2007, notably free school meals in Drancy, introduced 
in January 2007, and free public transport for RMI beneficiaries in the Île-de-France region. 
Rural communes have been excluded from the study. We have verified on several examples 
from 2001 and 2006 that small communes  distribute very few local and/or non-statutary 
transfers. The communes have been made anonymous for the presentation of results. 
Field of transfers 
Table 1 presents all the different resources and transfers taken into account for our seven 
different types of household. In addition to earned income, all deductions and all national and 
statutory transfers have been taken into account by applying the scales defined by law. We 
exclude the situation of people failing to collect national and statutory benefits to which they 
are entitled. One-off aids like the “back-to-work bonus” (“prime de retour à l’emploi”) have 
not  been  taken  into  account.  On  the  other  hand,  temporary  measures  like  the  incentive 
mechanism for leaving the RMI or the ASS (see Appendix 1) have been incorporated when 
specified. When this is not the case, the results of the simulations should be considered as 
long-term and between two stable situations of employment.  
The scales are those that were in force in 2007. For income tax, we take the scale for tax on 
income earned in 2006 (paid in 2007). The scales for PPE include increases for part-time 
work.  The  API  includes  family  support  allowance.  The  cost  of  complementary  CMU 
(universal health cover) has been based on the price of an equivalent complementary health 
insurance policy. Infant care allowance (for children under three) is composed of the “Prime 
à la naissance” (birth bonus – spread over three years here) and the basic allowance, but 
neither the CLCA (supplement for free choice of activity) nor the CLCMG (supplement for 
free choice of childcare). For families with three children, the benefits include the basic 
allowance but not the family supplement, who suppose that every child is more than three 
years old (see the presentation of typical cases in Table 3). 
The field of local and/or non-statutary transfers is rather difficult to delimit. It covers at the 
same time statutory and non-statutory benefits,  national and local benefits, monetary aids, other 
aids  in  the  form  of  cheap  rates  or  in  kind,  gifts  and  loans,  longer-term  aids  (telephone 
subscriptions) and others of an exceptional nature, benefits based on a scale and others based on 
social evaluation, etc. 
 7 





















































































































































































National and statutory resources               
RMI (minimum integration income)  X    X  X  X  X  X 
API (single-parent allowance)    X           
APL (housing benefit)  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Allocations Familiales (family allowance)            X  X 
ASF (family support allowance)    X  X         
PAJE-Naissance (infant care allowance - birth)    X      X  X  X 
PAJE (Basic infant care allowance)    X      X  X  X 
Back-to-school allowance      X      X  X 
CMU and CMU-C (universal health cover)  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
IRPP (personal income tax)  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
PPE (working tax credit)  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
“National” non-statutary transfers               
Christmas bonus  X    X  X  X  X  X 
Television licence fee exemption  X    X  X  X  X  X 
Telephone reduction  X    X  X  X  X  X 
Cheap-rate telephone  X    X  X  X  X  X 
Cheap-rate electricity  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Local council tax  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Local transfers               
Depending on each local situation              
 
The providers of assistance are also many and diverse, although in most cases, as the report 
written for ONPES observes (Baillon J.-N., Bellaredj F., Douard O., Mazalto M., 2006), local 
specialisation  means  that  duplicate  benefits  are  usually  avoided.  In  addition  to  regional 
councils (for transport), the departments and communes, there are charitable associations, 
public companies (telephone rates), etc. The family allowance funds have their own budgets and 
a certain degree of autonomy in the organisation of their social action. Local authorities, as well 
as choosing the rate of local taxation, can also grant specific reductions or exemptions. The 
study includes all these different providers of assistance, with the exception of charitable 
associations, which rarely use explicit scales and usually specialise in emergency aid – a domain 
that has been excluded from the study. 8 
Specific hypotheses 
The aim is to simulate the importance of local and/or non-statutary transfers in the resources of 
typical  households.  Emergency  and  exceptional  benefits  are  not  taken  into  account.  By 
definition, these are one-off payments, of low value and rarely cumulative. More generally, we 
have  not  been  able  to  include  purely  discretionary  benefits,  which  depend  on  a  social 
evaluation of the claimants’ situation by a local commission, due to a lack of scales and of 
detailed local information about the amount spent on these benefits. In any case, the gains 
from  these  discretionary  benefits  are  unstable  and  uncertain,  justifying  our  decision  to 
exclude them. We only take into account regular benefits, either means-tested or conditional 
on the status of the claimant (RMI, API, etc.). On principle, we have assumed that benefits of 
a similar nature are not cumulative; when two different scales exist for the same benefit (for 
example, if day care centres have one price for beneficiaries of family allowance funds and 
another for beneficiaries of Social Action Community Centres (CCAS)), we have kept the 
more generous of the two. 
The present  study does not take into consideration childminding  benefits, although these 
benefits are likely to have an important influence on women’s return to work. The problem is 
that  they  are  very  diverse  locally  according  to  the  type  of  childminding  (existence  of  a 
childcare  centers,  nature  of  the  childcare  center,  rate  of  financial  support).  Families  are 
therefore assumed not to use any form of childminding for children under three, which leads 
to making no distinction between couples where one partner works and those where both 
partners work. The implicit hypothesis is that some kind of free childminding solution exists 
–  a  close  relative,  for  example.  This  hypothesis  underestimates  the  cost  of  access  to 
employment for mothers.  
The gains obtained by households with two working adults are not incorporated either. For 
example, some communes reserve certain services for families with two working parents 
(although this was not the case for any of the communes in our sample for the benefits 
studied here, this condition is quite widespread in the provision of childcare services by local 
councils). Some companies also grant advantages to their employees depending on their type 
of household
4 (company crèches, corporate social benefits conditional on family status). This 
hypothesis has an opposite effect to the previous one, underestimating the gains from access 
to employment. 
In  the  case  of  price  reductions,  their  attribution  is  usually  not  dependent  on  any  social 
evaluation and can be equated with an entitlement for users who meet the required conditions 
of means or status. We have therefore directly incorporated the value of the price reduction, 
assuming  a  hypothesis  about  the  frequency  of  use  of  the  facilities  in  question.  It  is  not 
possible to exploit budget data for this type of aid, the cost of which is, in any case, relatively 
low for the local authorities providing these services. This is all the more true when they are 
collective,  largely  non-rival  goods  with  mainly  fixed  costs  (public  transport,  swimming 
pools, museums, theatres or other municipal sporting and cultural facilities).  
                                              
4 More generally, we exclude social aids paid by companies. There is no data base, national nor local, on these allowances. Taking 
them into account would increase the earned income.  9 
Table 2. Hypotheses on the take-up of benefits  
Nature of the benefit  Take-up  Frequency 
Telephone   Yes (social rate)  10 hours / month  
School meals  Yes, for 
schoolchildren 
144 days per year per schoolchild 
Before/after-school care  No   
Care for children not at school  No   
Day care centre (CLSH)  Yes  20 days per year per child over 6 years old. 
Holidays  Yes  1 week(7 days) / year 
Sporting activity  Yes  1 per week (swimming) 
Cultural activity   Yes  1 per month (museum or theatre) 
Transport  Yes  Season ticket where available. 
Otherwise,  hypothesis  of  150  annual  return 
train tickets for localities near urban centres 
(less  than  30  km)  and  75  return  tickets for 
further-removed localities. 
Housing Solidarity Fund  Yes  Every 10 years 
Household equipment  Yes  Every 5 years 
 
In the case of benefits in money or kind, we have made a distinction between those based on 
means-testing or status (e.g., holiday cheques from the Family Allowance Funds) and those 
which  depend  on  the  approval  of  an  evaluation  committee.  In  the  latter  case,  we  have 
assumed  that  the  aid  is  obtained  in  50 %  of  cases.  For  housing  benefits,  we  have  made 
additional hypotheses about the frequency with which they are obtained. Table 2 presents all 
the hypotheses concerning take-up. 
For the Housing Solidarity Fund (FSL) run by the departments, we have assumed that an aid 
is obtained every ten years; this is an aid for obtaining housing or staying in it and an aid for 
paying electricity, gas and water bills. In the case of aids for obtaining housing, the value of 
the  aid  usually  includes  two  months’  deposit  plus  one  month’s  rent,  insurance,  meter 
connection  fees,  removal  costs,  etc.  We  have  therefore  assumed  a  ten-yearly  aid 
corresponding to four months’ rent or to the maximum aid, if it is defined and of lower value. 
Not all the local councils specify whether the reductions offered to recipients of the RMI are 
extended to their families (for swimming pools or public transport, for example). To avoid 
bias, we only attribute the gain to the actual recipient of the means-tested benefit. Likewise, 
as we do not always have the information on reductions for large families, and as these are 
not dependent on income, we have excluded them. 
To attribute a value to each benefit, we take the average amount when this is known; when 
only the maximum is known, we take half of that. In some localities, we have no details 
about  the  scales  used.  In  this  case,  to  avoid  bias  when  aggregating  the  data,  we  have 





The typical cases are built from persons of reference aged between 25 and 60; we do not 
measure benefits for specific groups (disabled, elderly) other than the recipients of the RMI 
or the API. The types of household have been defined according to the situation of the person 
of reference - single person, single-parent family or couple – and the number and age of the 
children. In couples, only one partner is active (see Table 3). In all, with 7 typical cases in 13 
localities, we study 91 different situations. 
These different household configurations are not represented in the same proportions in the 
population  of  RMI  and  API  recipients.  According  to  statistics  from  the  CNAF  (national 
family  allowance  fund),  at  the  end  of  2008,  59.1 %  of  households  on  RMI  were  single 
persons and 24.3 % were single-parent families. Couples with no children only represent 
3.4 % of beneficiaries, couples with one child represent 4 % and couples with two or more 
children represent 9 % of the total number of beneficiaries. These are the data for mainland 
France and can vary between different towns and different benefits. In Paris, the share of 
single persons in the population of RMI and API recipients is 76 %, whereas the share of 
single-parent families is only 15 %. Over and above the local variations, what is most is 
therefore the strong over-representation of single persons and, to a lesser extent, single-parent 
families in the population of RMI recipients.  
 
Table 3. The typical cases  




































Single person  Between 25  
and 60  
      1 room 
Single-parent family 
with 1 child (API) 
Between 25  
and 60  
Under 3, not 
at school 
    2 rooms 
Single-parent family 
with 1 child (RMI) 
Between 25  
and 60  
Over 3, at 
school 
    2 rooms 
Couple with no children  Between 25  
and 60  
      2 rooms 
Couple with 1 child  Between 25  
and 60  
Under 3, not 
at school 
    3 rooms 
Couple with 2 children  Between 
25 and 60  
Between 6 
and 10, at 
primary 
school 
Under 3, not 
at school 
  3 rooms 
Couple with 3 children  Between 25 
and 60  
Between 6 




and 5, at 
nursery school 




Rents  are  estimated  on  the  basis  of  data  from  the  National  Federation  of  Estate  Agents 
(FNAIM)
5 on average surface areas in the private rented sector in different localities. When 
we do not have specific information about a commune, we have used either data about a 
nearby communes (e.g., Créteil for Fontenay-sous-Bois), or those about the local economic 
centre (e.g., Lille for Villeneuve d’Ascq and Tourcoing). In this case, we have applied a 
reduction of 10 % to the outlying commune. An additional 10 % reduction has been applied 
to take into account the length of residence in the housing. This estimation was used to 
calculate  the  amount  of  APL  (personalized  housing  benefit)  received  and  the  “family 
quotients”,  “disposable  income”  or  “economic  means”  used  in  certain  scales.  It  also 
determines the amount of FSL (housing solidarity fund) obtained. Some scales also take into 
account service charges; we have estimated these at 25 % of the rent. Table 4 presents the 
communes used as reference.  
Table 4. Communes of reference for the attribution of rents 
Commune studied  Commune of reference 
Arles  Marseille 
Martigues  Marseille 
Marseille  Marseille 
Béziers  Béziers 
Sète  Sète 
Tourcoing  Lille 
Villeneuve d’Ascq  Lille 
Drancy  Noisy-le-grand / Gagny 
Montreuil  Noisy-le-grand / Gagny 
Fontenay sous bois  Créteil 
Ivry sur Seine  Créteil 
Paris  Paris 18° 
Lyon  Lyon 
 
3. RMI, LOCAL TRANSFERS AND GAINS FROM RETURNING TO 
WORK  
Many informations can be obtained from the descriptive use of local social scales. As the 
scales were collected on two different occasions, with a first inventory carried out in 2001, it 
is possible to identify the major changes that have taken place since the beginning of the 
decade, which is one way to assess the impact of the numerous reforms. That is the purpose 




                                              
5 Source: L’observatoire national du marché locatif, FNAIM, September 2006. 12 
Diversity of local and/or non-statutary transfers 
One preliminary observation should be made: the scales of local transfers differ greatly, both 
from one town to another and between different benefits. This result, already established in our 
2002 study, is confirmed by the data of 2007. In each locality, there are usually as many different 
scales as there are different benefits. And for each benefit, there are as many different scales as 
there are localities in our study.  
Alongside  this  observation  of  diversity,  several  regularities  have  to  be  mentioned.  Firstly, 
although the scales of local social benefits are all different, their general appearance is often 
similar. The typical benefit consists of a fixed rate up to a given threshold of resources, above 
which people are ineligible. When there are several thresholds in a scale, the benefit is of a fixed 
rate between each threshold. So the scales of local and/or non-statutary transfers look like stairs – 
often with only one step. But the height and depth of the step differ greatly between benefits and 
localities. Two illustrations are given in Appendix 2 (Graphs A1 and B1). 
Next,  local  social  benefits  are  most  often  of  low  value.  On  average,  the  value  of  these 
benefits lies between 150 and 250 euros per year depending on the town and the type of 
household. Taken on its own, each local benefit therefore represents on average barely a few 
dozen euros per month for a household with no earned income. However, these benefits 
cannot be neglected, because they are so numerous: in all there are nearly twenty local and/or 
non-statutary allowances that supplement the income of underprivileged households.  
Table 5. Total value and relative weight of transfers by type of household (in euros per year and 
in %) 
A – Households with no earned income 
 

















Value  of  national  and 
statutory transfers (2)  7 916   10 640   13 578   12 209   13 224   17 291   21 287  
Value  of  local  and/or 
non-statutary  transfers 
(2) 
1 563   1 712   1 059   2 475   1 955   2 600   3 204  
Including  value  of 
local social benefits (2) 
918   948   777   1728   1 134   1 755   2 310  
Ratio  of  local  and/or 
non-statutary  transfers 
to total transfers (3) 
16  14  7  17  13  13  13 
Ratio  of  local  and/or 
non-statutary  transfers 
to  national  statutory 
transfers (3) 
20  16  8  20  15  15  15 
Ratio  of  local  social 
benefits  to  total  local 
or  non-statutary 
transfers (3) 
59  55  73  70  58  68  72 
1. SPF: single-parent family.  
2. In euros.  
3. In %.  13 
 
 
B – Households with earned income equal to 50 % of SMIC (minimum wage) 
 

















Value  of  national  and 
statutory transfers (2) 
1 700   4 340   8 290   6 506   7 741   11 722   15 823  
Value  of  local  and/or 
non-statutary  transfers 
(2) 
505   1 712   800   2 489   904   2 599   3 216  
Including  value  of 
local social benefits (2) 
464   948   635   1 741   710   1 754   2 321  
Ratio  of  local  and/or 
non-statutary  transfers 
to total transfers (3) 
23  28  9  28  10  18  17 
Ratio  of  local  and/or 
non-statutary  transfers 
to  national  statutory 
transfers (3) 
30  39  10  38  12  22  20 
Ratio  of  local  social 
benefits  to  total  local 
or  non-statutary 
transfers (3) 
92  55  79  70  79  67  72 
1. SPF: single-parent family.  
2. In euros.  




In Table 5 we have aggregated these benefits and made a simple, unweighted average for the 
thirteen  communes  covered  by  the  present  study.  It  can  be  seen  that  local  and/or  non-
statutary transfers represent an increase of 15 to 20 % of national and statutory transfers. 
These figures are slightly lower than those of our 2002 study, including for the three towns 
covered by both studies. This could be explained by the more restrictive hypotheses we have 
adopted concerning the conditions for the accumulation of benefits in the present study. The 
households  where  the  share  of  local  and/or  non-statutary  transfers  is  lowest  are  families 
receiving the API. This is related to both the high level of national and statutory transfers and 
the low level of local and/or non-statutary transfers. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, by 
construction, certain of these transfers are reserved for children above a certain age (school 
meals, after-school care, etc.), and in our typical cases we have assumed that the children of 
single-parent families receiving the RMI are more than three years old, while the API is 
reserved for children  under three.  Secondly, unlike beneficiaries  of the RMI, households 
receiving the API are not entitled to the Christmas bonus, television licence fee exemption, or 
reduced-rate  telecommunications.  These  observations  are  valid  for  households  with  no 
earned income. When we assume that the earned income is half a SMIC (minimum wage), 
the total value of local and/or non-statutary transfers in relation to all national and statutory 
transfers is very different, and can reach nearly 40 % of those transfers.  14 
There does not appear to be any clear relation between the size of the household and the level 
of “droits connexes” as a proportion of total transfers (Graph 1). In the study we published in 
2002,  we  found,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  relative  weight  of  local  and/or  non-statutary 
transfers increased with the household’s size. The difference can be explained by the strong 
rise in individual benefits, such as reduced transport fares provided by regional councils, 
which did not exist at the time of our first inventory. Furthermore, we have assumed that the 
frequency of use of sporting and cultural facilities does not depend on the size of the family.  
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Amount of local allowances (left scale)




Gains from returning to work  
There are certain situations where “work doesn’t pay”. It is well-known that from a long-
term perspective, i.e., outside the incentive mechanism whereby transfer income and earned 
income can be accumulated during the first few months of a return to work, the differential 
nature of the RMI may mean that going back to work leads to no monetary gain: excluding 
the incentive, the increase in earned income is entirely offset by the reduction in RMI as long 
as the exit point from the RMI has not been reached, corresponding to a marginal tax rate of 
100 %. The distribution of net incomes as a function of gross incomes (Graph 2) shows that 
after a horizontal plateau, the household’s net income falls before rising back up (Graph 2-
A). This trough is characteristic of a zone where “it doesn’t pay to work”. It can only be 
observed  for  single  persons,  couples  without  children  and  couples  with  more  than  two 
children. Further along in the distribution of incomes, there is a slight drop, forming a local 
peak. This peak corresponds to the exit point from complementary CMU: the household’s 
income falls when it is no longer entitled to complementary universal health cover. 
 
Graph 2. Net income from statutory national transfers as a function of gross income  
(average over the sample)  
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Does  the  working  tax  credit  (PPE),  introduced  in  2001  and  reformed  every  year  since, 
provide  a  solution  to  these  “welfare  traps”?  It  certainly  affects  them  perceptibly,  by 
provoking a sudden rise in income (Graph 2-B). This occurs at the spot where households 
become eligible for the working tax credit, when their earned income exceeds 0.3 SMIC (the 17 
value of the credit received in 2007 for a single person was 322 € at that level of earned 
income). The working tax credit is based on a scale that increases up to 1 SMIC and then 
decreases to zero at 1.3 SMIC, and it is increased by a fixed amount for each dependant in 
the household. The successive reforms have increased the credit for all wage levels, but most 
strongly around the half-SMIC level. However, these reforms have not been sufficient to 
make up for the loss of income caused by the graduated nature of national transfers, and they 
have failed to remove those areas where “work doesn’t pay”. 
However, when we incorporate the incentive mechanism as it existed before the introduction 
of the RSA, the “welfare trap” effect disappears (Graph 2-C). Extended by the law against 
exclusion of 1998, the incentive is the temporary possibility of accumulating earned income 
and benefits. When recipients of the RMI return to work, they are allowed to keep the whole 
of their benefit during three months and then half of it during the next nine months. The 
principle of the RSA is to make this mechanism permanent
6. If we only take into account 
national benefits, as in Graph 2-C, then this incentive combined with the working tax credit 
is strong enough tools to prevent the disincentive effects of the RMI’s differential nature. If 
we ignore local benefits and non-statutary transfers for the time being, then this result repeats 
one of the main conclusions of the study by Hagneré and Trannoy (2001). 
What  happens  if  we  now  take  local  and/or  non-statutary  transfers  into  account?  These 
benefits are targeted very precisely on the most disadvantaged households, and can therefore 
strongly reduce the gains from returning to work, even if they are individually of low value. 
To verify this, it is helpful to use a synthetic concept we first proposed in our 2002  article: 
the “reservation working time”. This is the minimum number of hours per week that a person 
must work, on the minimum wage, to earn more than they would receive when unemployed. 
Graph 3 illustrates the way this indicator is calculated. To earn the equivalent of the means-
tested  benefit  received  by  an  unemployed  person  (namely,  9479 €  on  average  in  the 
communes of our sample), a single person has two options. He can either work the equivalent 
of  6½ hours per week on the minimum wage, or work more than 26 hours per week. These 
calculations are performed on an annual basis for a net minimum wage (when we take as our 
reference a half-time job on the minimum wage, we calculate in terms of an annual income 
equivalent to a half-time job worked during the whole year).  
                                              
6 Bearing in mind that with the RSA, the marginal tax rate is 38 %: the recipient loses 38 euros of benefits for every 100 
euros  of  earned  income.  These  38%  are  higher  than  the  0 %  for  the  first  three  months  of  the  previous  incentive 
mechanism but greater than the 50 % for the following nine months.  18 
Graph 3. The reservation working time, an illustration for a single person with no children 



















































= 8 880€ per year
= 26 h of work per week 
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Graph 4 presents net income as a function of gross income for each type of household when 
all transfers are taken into account. Local and non-statutory benefits increase the disposable 
resources, particularly for households with little or no earned income (Graphs 2-B and 4). On 
the  other  hand,  taking  into  account  all  transfers,  including  local  and/or  non-statutary 
transfers, widens the range of incomes for which “work doesn’t pay” (Graphs 5-A and 5-B). 
All types of households are now affected by situations where work doesn’t pay.  
 19 
Graph 4. Net income (all transfers) as a function of gross income  
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Graph 5. Net income as a function of gross income  
(average over the sample) 
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By calculating the reservation working times, we can visualize the amplifying effect of non-
statutory and local benefits (Graph 6). When we only take national and statutory transfers 
into account, all types of households experience situations where work doesn’t pay. When we 
take all transfers into consideration, the reservation working time increases sharply for all 
types of household. For all localities and all types of household, there is only one case out of 
the 91 typical cases where the reservation working time is zero, when local benefits are taken 
into account (Table 4). For the recipients of RMI, the annual equivalent of a half-time job on 
the minimum wage is not sufficient to make up for the loss of benefits, whatever the type of 
household. For families with two or more children, even a full-time job on the minimum 
wage is not sufficient. 
Table 6. Reservation working time  
Reservation working time incorporating local benefits (RMI and PPE)  
In net weekly hours 












(1 child) (1) 
SPF with 
API 
(1 child) (1) 
Commune 01  47  28  20  29  23  24  10 
Commune 02  46  27  18  28  23  21  10 
Commune 03  46  26  18  28  22  21  10 
Commune 04  46  27  18  28  22  21  10 
Commune 05  48  41  20  32  24  24  10 
Commune 06  49  42  21  33  24  29  10 
Commune 07  52  47  22  36  27  37  10 
Commune 08  54  47  24  36  29  38  18 
Commune 09  54  45  25  36  29  38  10 
Commune 10  57  48  25  36  29  41  10 
Commune 11  51  44  22  34  27  33  10 
Commune 12  49  42  22  33  24  31  0 
Commune 13  50  43  20  33  24  30  10 
Average  50  39  21  32  25  30  10 
Range (Max - Min)  10  22  7  8  7  20  18 
Minimum   46  26  18  28  22  21  0 
Maximum   57  48  25  36  29  41  18 
1. SPF: single-parent family  
Interpretation: in commune 01, with RMI and PPE, but without the incentive mechanism, a couple with 3 children must have 
an  earned  income  representing  47  hours  of  net  minimum  wage  to  earn  more  than  they  would  receive  by  remaining 
unemployed. 
Field: the table incorporates national and statutory transfers, local benefits and other non-statutory allowances available in 
the  13 communes of our sample under the hypotheses defined for typical cases and household consumption. 
Source: EQUINOXE.  
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Graph 6. Reservation working times with and without local and non-statutary transfers  















































































































































































































































These conclusions are the same as we obtained in our 2002 study (which did not take API 
into account). This may seem surprising, given the number of reforms adopted since then 
with the express purpose of reducing the scale and frequency of welfare traps. These include 
the reform of the local council tax in 2000, the reform of housing benefits in 2001, the 
introduction of the working tax credit in the same year (followed by extensions to its field of 
application every year since then) and the “back-to-work bonus” of 1000 euros in 2005, the 
field of which was also widened in 2006 (this bonus is excluded from our study). Admittedly, 
these reforms did have a real effect, as we have seen in the case of the working tax credit, 
which substantially modified households’ net incomes. They were not, however, sufficient to 
compensate  for  the  graduated  nature  of  social  transfers  for  low-income  households. 
Moreover, the working tax credit (PPE) appears to have a rather paradoxical effect. It can be 
seen on the different graphs (2-B, 2-C, 4 and 5) that becoming eligible for the PPE at an 
earned income of 0.3 SMIC makes the corresponding jobs locally profitable. Thanks to the 
PPE, a job paying 0.3 SMIC is “worthwhile”, but a job paying 0.5 or 0.7 SMIC is not. The 
PPE only really makes the worst-paid jobs worthwhile.  
The benefit reforms of the 2000s did not succeed in getting rid of the welfare trap because 
they were counteracted by other measures, with opposing effects on the gains from returning 
to work. These include travel benefits given by regional councils (such as free bus/subway 
passes for RMI recipients in the Île-de-France region since 2007), exemption from television 
licence fees for RMI recipients, reduced telephone rates launched in 2000, definition of a 
price for “necessity goods” and a reduced rate for electricity
7. These benefits were extended 
again  in  2008  with  the  special  “solidarity  rate”  for  gas
8.  All  these  innovations  have 
                                              
7 We have not included the “aide à la cuve”: - a heating oil aid worth 200 euros per year in 2008 that was abolished in 2009.  
8 This extension is not taken into account in our simulations.  22 
counteracted  the  accumulated  effects  of  the  reforms  of  the  working  tax  credit,  housing 
benefits, local council taxes and family allowances.  
4. THE EFFECT OF THE RSA ON GAINS FROM RETURNING TO 
WORK 
In this final section, we study the consequences of the replacement of RMI and API by the 
RSA. The intention behind the RSA is to avoid both the differential nature of the RMI and 
the temporary nature of the incentive mechanism.  When recipients of the RSA return to 
work, their RSA is reduced by 38%, leaving them with a net gain of disposable income, 
ceteris  paribus,  of  62%  of  their  earned  income.  This  marginal  tax  rate  of  38%  is  more 
generous than the RMI with incentive mechanism (after the initial three-month phase of total 
accumulation) which represented a marginal tax rate of 50%. Without the incentive scheme, 
the RMI’s marginal tax rate was 100%. For a single person, the exit point from the RSA 
corresponds  to  1.04  times  the  full-time  minimum  wage.  State  funding  of  the  additional 
income corresponding to the RSA allows to break down the benefit into “basic RSA”, which 
corresponds to the former RMI (or API) and is funded by the departments, and “working 
RSA”, which is funded by the State (Diagram 1). 
 
Diagram 1: from RMI to RSA 
 
Interpretation: with no earned income, recipients only receive the basic RSA (the former RMI or API); if their 
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Working 








the “basic RSA” (paid by the department) and a “working RSA” (paid by the State); above the RMI exit point 
and up to the RSA exit point, they only receive the “working RSA”.  
 
The working tax credit (PPE) has been maintained in its entirety. The scale that is most 
favourable to the beneficiary, out of either the RSA or the PPE, is always chosen. The RSA 
scale is applied in the case of low earned incomes, and then the PPE, but for modest amounts. 
In certain cases, the RSA has been accompanied by a redefinition of the conditions governing 
the attribution of national non-statutary transfers. The television licence fee exemption given 
to recipients of the RMI was maintained in 2009 and will remain, on a means-tested basis, up 
until 2011. The reduction of local council tax, on the other hand, has been abolished. 
 
As far as local benefits are concerned, we assume that the introduction of the RSA was not 
accompanied by any reforms in local benefits and other non-statutary transfers. The scales 
and conditions of eligibility remain the same: the benefits hitherto given to recipients of the 
RMI are now given to recipients of the RSA. We adopt the same hypothesis for beneficiaries 
of the API
9. The stability of conditions of eligibility for local benefits has different effects 
depending on the nature of the benefit. For status-based benefits, the eligible public has been 
widened by extending the criterion of status to all RSA recipients, generating an additional 
cost for the institution paying the benefit. For means-tested benefits, the RSA is included in 
the income base (i.e., the different resources taken into account to calculate eligibility and the 
level of benefit paid) whenever the RMI was. This has the effect of increasing recipients’ 
income, since the RSA is more generous than the RMI, and therefore reducing the amount of 
benefits paid. 
In the absence of local reforms, the RSA achieves its objective 
Under these hypotheses, the RSA is spectacularly effective in terms of gains from returning 
to work. On average, over our sample of thirteen communes and for all types of household, 
the RSA eliminates all areas in which working represents a loss of income compared to 
remaining inactive (Graph 7). To appreciate the scale of the difference between “before” and 
“after” the RSA, the curves can be compared to those in Graph 4. 
 
                                              
9 We do not assume a merger of the related entitlements between the RMI and the API: we assume that the differences in access are 
maintained. 24 
Graph 7. Net income (all transfers) as a function of gross income  
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Instead of dropping sharply, as they did for households leaving the RMI, local and non-
statutary transfers are gradually reduced as earned income increases (Graph 8). This gentle 
decline is linked to the effect of the income base: the RSA is included in the income base 
used  to  calculate  certain  related  benefits,  thus  reducing  the  value  of  those  benefits.  The 
sudden fall in benefits on leaving the RMI, linked to the effect of status-based benefits, now 
occurs at a much higher level in the distribution of incomes, at the RSA exit point, which is 
situated at a level where the earned income is high enough to cushion the fall in transfer 
income. As the threshold effects have shifted, there is indeed a net increase in disposable 
income compared with the situation of not working. Remember that these calculations do not 
take into account the  abolition of the council tax reductions previously enjoyed by RMI 
recipients. 
 25 
Graph 8. Average value of local and non-statutary transfers for a single person (unweighted 
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We can compare the effectiveness of the RSA with that of previous schemes pursuing the 
same objective of providing a monetary incentive to return to work: the working tax credit 
and the temporary incentive mechanism (accumulating RMI and earned income) (Graph 9). 
The working tax credit has very little effect on the profile of disposable income and fails to 
eliminate  the  zones  where  returning  to  work  doesn’t  pay.  The  temporary  incentive 
mechanism, on the other hand, produces a profile quite similar to that of the RSA. When 
added together with the PPE (which is not possible with the RSA, where only the more 
generous of the two – PPE or RSA – is given), it provides a disposable income slightly 
higher than that of the RSA, for a narrow range of incomes between 0.3 and about 0.5 SMIC. 
For higher levels of income, the RSA increases disposable income considerably compared 
with the incentive mechanism.  26 
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The RSA reduces or eliminates most of the threshold effects that the RMI created in local 
and non-statutary transfers. Instead of amplifying the RMI’s marginal tax rate of 100 %, 
means-tested local transfers gradually decrease as the marginal tax rate of 38 % reduces the 
RSA. On the other hand, it does not eliminate status-based effects: there is still an abrupt fall 
in those transfers at the exit point from the benefit, but this occurs later because the RSA exit 
point is by definition higher than that of the RMI. In the situations studied here, it occurs at 
the level of an earned income ranging between 1 SMIC (single person) and 2.1 SMIC (couple 
with three children). 
The  RSA’s  effectiveness  in  providing  a  back-to-work  incentive  can  be  measured  by 
comparing  the  reservation  working  times  before  and  after  implementation  of  the  reform. 
Remember  that  this  concept  does  not  prejudge  the  behaviour  of  households  in  these 
situations; it simply measures the wage level above which disposable income is permanently 
higher  than  that  obtained  with  no  earned  income.  To  facilitate  the  comparison,  we  have 
translated this wage level into the weekly hours worked on the net minimum wage. In this 
perspective,  Table 7  compares  different  types  of  means-tested  benefit,  indicating  the 
minimum, average and maximum reservation working time, taking into account the local and 
non-statutary transfers in the thirteen communes studied. 
While the working tax credit has superficial effects on the gains from returning to work, 
measured here by the reservation working times, the RSA has a very clear impact on these 
gains. With a marginal tax rate of 38 %, the RSA makes any level of work “worthwhile” 
compared with the benefits available to households remaining inactive, in every commune 
and  for  almost  every  type  of  household.  The  RSA  therefore  fully  achieves  its  intended 27 
purpose,  even  when  we  take  into  account  local  and  non-statutary  transfers  and  the 
interdependence between benefit scales and national and statutory transfers.   
 
Table 7. Reservation working times before and after RSA (minimum, average and maximum 
over the sample of communes) 
In weekly hours on net minimum wage  





















Min  47  31  22  32  24  29  17 
Avg  50  43  30  35  27  36  22 
Max  57  50  40  38  31  43  34 
RMI with PPE 
Min  46  26  18  28  22  21  0 
Avg  50  39  21  32  25  30  10 




Min  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Avg  4  18  0  0  9  12  0 
Max  57  48  0  0  29  41  0 
RSA 
(MTR 38%) (2) 
Min  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Avg  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Max  5  0  0  0  0  1  0 
RSA  
(MTR 40%) 
Min  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Avg  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Max  5  0  0  0  0  1  0 
RSA 
(MTR 45%) 
Min  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Avg  0  7  0  0  2  3  0 
Max  6  48  0  0  20  41  0 
RSA 
(MTR 50%) 
Min  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Avg  7  18  0  2  18  12  0 
Max  57  48  0  28  29  41  0 
1. SPF: single-parent family. 
2. MTR = marginal tax rate. It corresponds to the proportion by which the benefit (in this case the 
RSA) is reduced following a rise in earned income; the marginal tax rate of 38 % chosen for the RSA 
means that for each extra euro earned in wages, the RSA is reduced by 38 cents: all else being equal, 
the  disposable  income  therefore  increases  by  62 cents.  The  marginal  tax  rate  can  be  calculated: 
1- ∆RD/∆RA  where  ∆RD  is  the  variation  in  disposable  income  and  ∆RA  the  variation  in  earned 
income. 
Interpretation: in 2007, in the 13 communes studied, taking into account local and non-statutary transfers but not the working tax credit 
(PPE), a single person had to work between 24 and 31 hours on the SMIC (27 hours on average) to obtain a disposable income higher 
than that obtained with no earned income, in the case of the RMI without PPE.  
The average reservation working times in this table are the averages of local reservation times; they are not directly comparable with 
those presented in Graph 6.  
Source: EQUINOXE. 
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This shows that with the RMI, in all the communes studied, a certain number of hours must 
be worked before the disposable income of the household rises definitively. Depending on 
the type of household, a minimum of somewhere between a half-time and a full-time week 
on the minimum wage is needed before the income increases. The incentive mechanism with 
a marginal tax rate of 50 % temporarily removes these welfare traps, in all communes and for 
three types of household (couples with one or two children and single-parent families on 
API). For the other types, notably single persons who constitute the majority of recipients of 
these benefits, there are communes where the reservation working time remains high despite 
the incentive mechanism and the PPE, approaching or even exceeding a full-time working 
week on the SMIC.  
With a marginal tax rate of 38 %, and even if it cannot be accumulated with the PPE, the 
RSA eliminates the zones where “working does not pay” in every commune and for almost 
every household type. Out of the 91 situations studied (13 communes and 7 household types), 
only two have a non-zero reservation working time. Even in these two cases, the values are 
very low (five hours and one hour per week on the SMIC respectively).  
By varying the marginal tax rate of the RSA, we show that above a 40 % rate, zones where it 
is not worth working reappear. The rate of 38 % chosen by the government is therefore close 
to  the  maximum  possible  in  terms  of  the  declared  objective  of  producing  a  monetary 
incentive for returning to work. 
CONCLUSIONS  
Local  and/or  non-statutary  transfers  cover  a  vast  set  of  monetary  benefits  given  to  low-
income households to top-up national and statutory benefits. These secondary aids have been 
largely neglected, and yet their analysis is indispensable to an accurate assessment of the 
impact of benefit reforms on incomes. In this study, we have used the EQUINOXE micro-
simulation model to take into account the interdependence between local or non-statutary 
transfers and national, statutory benefits. Our aim has been to evaluate the effect on gains 
from returning to work of the introduction of the Earned Income Supplement (Revenu de 
Solidarité Active - RSA) to replace both the Minimum Integration Income (Revenu Minimum 
d’Insertion - RMI) and the Single Parent Allowance (Allocation Parent Isolé - API). 
In Paris, Lyon, Marseille and ten medium-sized towns, we have analysed the total value of 
benefits as a function of household income, exhaustively incorporating every national and/or 
statutory benefit and every local and/or non-statutory benefit as long as they have or can be 
assigned a monetary value and are calculated on the basis of a scale. The present study extends 
and updates the work of Anne and L’Horty (2002), using data from 2007 and a new sample of 
communes. 
Although local and non-statutary transfers are most often of low value (somewhere between 
150 and 250 euros per year for each particular local benefit, depending on the locality and type 
of household), their sheer numbers make them too important to ignore: the income of poor 
households is complemented by nearly twenty transfers. Overall, these benefits increase national 
and statutory transfers by 15 to 20 %.  
So despite their low individual value, these multiple benefits, targeted very precisely on the 
poorest households, can strongly reduce the gains from returning to work. For recipients of 
the RMI, our simulations show that the annual equivalent of a half-time job on the minimum 29 
wage  is  not  enough  to  make  up  for  the  loss  of  benefit  income,  whatever  the  type  of 
household. For couples with two or more children, not even a full-time job on the minimum 
wage is enough. 
This result is very similar to the one we obtained in our previous study on data collected in 
2001.  This  is  quite  surprising  when  one  considers  the  scale  of  the  reforms  introduced 
throughout the 2000s (reforms of the local council tax, housing benefits, family allowances 
and the working tax credit). These reforms clearly had a positive impact on the gains from 
returning to work, particularly the introduction of the working tax credit, which substantially 
modified  households’  net  incomes.  But  they  hardly  had  any  effect  on  the  zones  where 
returning to work entails a loss of income for those on benefits. The working tax credit in 
particular does not make any but the lowest-paying jobs more worthwhile.  
If the reforms of social transfers of the 2000s failed to eliminate these welfare traps, it is 
because their effects were counteracted by the effects of other reforms of social transfers: the 
development of travel benefits given by regional councils (such as free season tickets for 
RMI recipients in the Île-de-France region since 2007), television licence fee exemption for 
RMI recipients thanks to a 2004 law, the social telephone reduction since 2000, reduced rate 
telephone and electricity bills since 2005. All these new measures offset the impact on the 
gains from returning to work of the reforms of the working tax credit, housing benefits, local 
council tax and family allowances.  
The RSA was introduced in place of both the RMI and the API with the explicit goal of 
making work pay. According to our simulations, it has made returning to work profitable in 
almost every commune and for almost every type of household: out of the 91 simulated 
situations (seven typical cases in thirteen communes), only two continue to experience a loss 
of income, and only over a very narrow range of working hours.  
The marginal tax rate of 38% (the amount by which the RSA is reduced for each rise in 
earned  income)  is  close  to  the  40 %  limit,  where  negative  effects  on  the  back-to-work 
incentive reappear locally. Here, the average reservation working times are still low, but the 
maxima  are  comparable  to  those  observed  with  the  RMI.  The  same  holds  true  with  a 
marginal tax rate of 50%, corresponding to the temporary incentive mechanism that existed 
before the RSA.  
It remains to study the robustness of these results under different hypotheses concerning the 
reactions of local benefit providers. As it stands, the scenario studied here would lead to a 
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FROM RMI TO RSA 
The  RMI  is  a  guaranteed  minimum  income  accompanied  by  an  incentive  mechanism, 
whereby beneficiaries returning to work can continue, temporarily, to receive a proportion of 
their RMI on top of their earned income. It is completed by a set of non-monetary incentives 
to return to work, with the “contrat d’insertion” (professional integration contract) and local 
measures of support for claimants. If we focus on the long-term, monetary dimension of the 
benefits given to poor households, the RMI can be summed up as a means-tested differential 
benefit that provides the strict minimum to take households up to the guaranteed level of 
resources. If we denote i the size of the household, R0i the guaranteed minimum income for a 
household of type i and w its earned income (more generally, w denotes all the resources 
included in the income base used to calculate the RMI), then the amount of RMI received by 
the household, denoted T(RMI), can be written:  
 
( ) w R RMI T i i t - = 0           (1) 
 
where t  denotes the marginal tax rate on earned income. In the case of the RMI, this latter is 
100 % ( 1 = t  ), because at the end of the incentive period, each additional euro of earned 
income means one less euro of benefit. This reduction in transfer income is equivalent to a 
tax rise. The marginal tax rate (or marginal benefit reduction rate) expresses the variation in 






t - =             (2) 
 
RMI and local/non-statutary transfers 
The income of a household on the RMI, denoted Y(RMI), is equal to the sum of the RMI 
given by equation (1), the earned income and transfers included in the RMI income base  
(denoted w), and the local/non-statutary transfers, covering all the other benefits not included 
in  the  RMI  income  base.  These  aids  are  denoted  DCi(w),  because  they  depend  on  the 
household’s size and income: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) w DC w R RMI Y i i i + - + = t 1 0         (3) 
 
In  practice,  DCi(w)  is  an  aggregate  of  several  benefits  attributed  by  non-coordinated 
institutions each with its own specific scale. It is a function of the earned income with points 
of discontinuity forming an overall profile of irregular steps (for an illustration of this, see 
graphs  A2  and  B2  in  Appendix 2).  From  the  households’  point  of  view,  the  effective 
marginal  tax  rate  is  the  sum  of  that  of  the  RMI  and  that  of  the  local  and  non-statutary 
transfers. It presents numerous discontinuity points (for an illustration, see graphsA3 and B3 
in Appendix 2).  32 
Implementation of the RSA 
The RSA is intended to reduce the marginal tax rate on earned incomes to a level that should 
remain fixed at 30 %. The mechanism remains at a constant rate. No discontinuities in the 
marginal tax rate are envisaged. In addition, the RSA does not modify the value of the RMI 
received by households with no earned income, whatever their configuration. The RMI’s 
implicit scale of equivalence, whereby couple were given 150 % of a single person’s income, 
30 %  more  for  each  dependent  child  and  40 %  for  the  third  child  (a  couple  with  three 
children  received  2.5  times  more  RMI  than  a  single  person) remained the same with the 
transition from RMI to RSA. The term  i R0  therefore remained unchanged when the reform was 
implemented. The three equations written above continue to apply. The only difference is the 
value of the marginal tax rate (0.3 instead of 1). The new system is therefore unequivocally 
always more generous for all types of household. 
The  choice  of  a  constant-rate  mechanism  facilitates  calculations  from  the  recipients’ 
viewpoint, and is almost certainly a guarantee of simplicity and clarity. It allows to deduce 
mechanically the range of application of the measure, i.e., the level of earned income above 
which it no longer applies. This earned income ceiling, above which claimants are no longer 
eligible  for  the  RSA  (denoted  max w ),  can  be  very  easily  calculated  from  the  guaranteed 






max =             (4) 
 
For example, for a single person with no earned income, the RMI is of the order of 0.35 gross 
SMIC. After the introduction of the RSA with a marginal tax rate of 30 %, the earned income 
ceiling is 0.35/0.3 = 1.15 SMIC. The table below gives the values for different types of 
households and different RSA coefficients. A rise of 5 points in the marginal tax rate reduces 
the earned income ceiling by 16 percent.  
Earned income ceiling for RSA eligibility  
(in multiples of gross SMIC) 
  RSA Coefficient (marginal tax rate) 
Type of household  0.3  0.35  0.4  0.45  0.5 
Single person  1.15  0.99  0.86  0.77  0.69 
Single-parent family, 1 child   1.73  1.48  1.29  1.15  1.04 
Couple without children  1.73  1.48  1.29  1.15  1.04 
Couple 1 child  2.07  1.78  1.55  1.38  1.24 
Couple 2 children  2.42  2.07  1.81  1.61  1.45 
Couple 3 children  2.88  2.47  2.16  1.92  1.73 Appendix 2 
SCALES OF LOCAL/NON-STATUTARY TRANSFERS: TWO 
EXAMPLES 
A. single person living in X 





















































































































































































































































Exonération de redevance TV
Réduction sociale téléphonique
Tarif Social Téléphone











Caisse des écoles Restauration
scolaire
Caisse des écoles Centre de loisirs





























































































































































































































































































































































































































on local and no-statutory transfers
 
Source: EQUINOXE. 35 
B. A couple with two children living in Y 



















































































































































































































































Exonération de redevance TV
Réduction sociale téléphonique
Tarif Social Téléphone
Tarif  social électricité
taxe d'habitation Gain
CAF Aide aux vacances
CAF Equipement mobilier
CAF Entrée ou Maintien dans les
lieux
Département  FSL





Commune Paris logement famille
Commune Avantages EDF pour les
familles
Commune Carte Paris Famille
Commune Avantages EDF pour les
personnes démunies de ressources
Commune Aide à l'amélioration de
l'habitat

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































on local and non-statutary transfers
 
Source: Equinoxe.  TEPP Working Papers 2010 
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